Globally shared and intensively used maritime infrastructures such as ports and straits have the potential to cause trans-boundary and multi-sector impacts on our society in case of disruption. This type of infrastructure can be called a "maritime global critical infrastructure (MGCI)"; its disruption can be caused by various types of hazards. IRGC (2011) was first to focus on this issue, identifying critical deficits of risk governance in an MGCI and making recommendations for improvement. However, a detailed impact assessment of a major disruption to an MGCI has not been fully conducted due to various factors including the complex interrelations and mechanisms of MGCI activities and processes and their cascading impacts, the limited availability and difficulty of access to the necessary data sets at regional and global scales, the need to combine modeling approaches from various fields.
INTRODUCTION
Increases in worldwide energy demand and industrial supply-chain systems among different countries have led to our society becoming increasingly dependent on international maritime and air shipping services. In particular, international hub ports and straits, where greater numbers of ships, airplanes and their handling cargos are concentrated than anywhere else, are regarded as potential choke points: i.e. the disruption of services at such points can cause enormous and complex impacts on global economic activities. These international hub ports and straits are regarded as so-called "global critical infrastructures" and intensive efforts are required to ensure their safety. International straits such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the Suez and Panama Canals, which have certain limitations of traffic capacity, can be thought of as representative infrastructures and there is a need to enhance security and disaster mitigation levels based on risk assessments of these representative areas. Based on the work presented in IRGC (2011), a maritime global critical infrastructure (MGCI) can be defined as systems and assets as they relate to marine activities specifically and have the capacity to impact international security, global economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of these.
An inherent characteristic of global critical infrastructures is that they will involve various stakeholders worldwide. The successful involvement of those stakeholders as well as the identification and quantification of trans-boundary risks are key issues for constructing burden-sharing schemes for risk reduction. Another important aspect of global critical infrastructures is that they are subject to a growing trend of increasingly complex risk. That is, the risks associated with global critical infrastructures can evolve as the concentration of economic activities and supporting infrastructures develops. For example, an increase in heavy vessel traffic might make ship collisions more likely, and pg. 3 densely located oil facilities along the coastlines might result in cascading impacts on adjacent facilities.
These types of concentrations tend to create benefits as an efficient economic system, but, on the other hand, fewer investments are made in other alternative infrastructure systems. Renn and Walker (2008) discussed a global risk governance scheme for general risks including complex and interconnected infrastructures such as MGCIs. They discussed how their risk governance framework could be applied to such a risk and demonstrated several case studies. Essentially, their risk governance framework is composed of phases of pre-assessment, risk appraisal, tolerability & acceptability judgment and risk management. Each phase and its contents are closely interlinked through communication among the stakeholders related to each relevant issue. According to this comprehensive risk governance framework, MGCIs were still in the early stage of risk governance just a few years ago and were in need of more intensive pre-assessment and risk appraisal to characterize the associated risks. IRGC (2011) focused on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a case study for the development of commonly recognized risk scenarios and the identification of risk governance deficits based on the results of several multi-stakeholder workshops1. The risk scenarios identified as having the potential to result in a blockage of the straits, based on pre-assessments conducted by participants, were ship collision, chemical facility explosion and fire and cyber attack. The following remarks are part of the report findings and are described as part of identified risk governance deficits: "A fundamental risk governance deficit in the Straits comes from the fact that transit passage through the Straits is an international right that shall not be impeded under international law, but the costs of organizing 1 The workshops were held in 2009 and 2011. Participants were from littoral states and user countries in Asia, including persons from central/local governments, shipping companies, universities and private research institutes. More details are given in the IRGC study (IRGC 2011) pg. 4 governance mechanisms and of maintaining and upgrading infrastructure to ensure safe, secure and sustainable usage are externalities to those who use the Straits." [p.39] . This identified deficit focus on the importance of assessing externalities related to the Straits, which are likely not related to only a single stakeholder.
Assessing economic impacts caused by the disruption of MGCI is one of the approaches to understand one aspect of such externality. For example, it is the good example that Sullivan (2010) addresses the importance of the Horn of Africa in terms of the supply chain impacts due to piracies.
The result gives a rough image on how much who should pay for safety investments against piracy. The work presented in this paper also puts focus on externality of MGCI in terms of economic impacts of its disruption, which was touched but not sufficiently discussed in IRGC (2011), especially in terms of global impacts. Quantitative risk assessment of MGCI is achieved by integrating a global economic impact model and a technological hazard estimation model. Thus the paper would provide a prototype interdisciplinary case study for MGCI. Specifically, the example of an oil refinery explosion and fire in the Singapore Strait is identified here as a disruption scenario for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
An application of the models to the disruption scenario reveals the value of the Straits and Port as well as the distributed economic damages incurred by stakeholders, which is an important input to the discussion of requirements for a relatively fair governance scheme.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDIES IN THE STRAITS OF

MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
About the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
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In this study we focus on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (herein "the Straits") and the Port of Singapore. This is one of the most congested areas in the world in terms of maritime transportation.
Most of the sea routes connecting Europe and East Asia are obliged to pass thorough the Straits and the number of vessels passing through continues to increase, from 55,957 in 2000 55,957 in to 74,133 in 2010 55,957 in (JAMS 2011 . This upward trend throughout the decade includes increases in VLCCs2 (from 3,163 to 4,333), Bulk Carriers (from 4,708 to 11,642) and Container Ships (from 18,283 to 24,806) . According to Containerization International (2010), the Port of the Singapore handled 29.92 m TEUs3 in 2008 and is ranked first in the world for cargo. The closure or functional failure of the Straits or their port facilities has the potential to cause significant impacts on global economic activities, and as such both the Straits and their port facilities are considered to be global critical infrastructures. As described in Fig. 1 , there are alternative sea routes to the Straits, which pass thorough the Sunda and Lombok Straits. However, it normally takes a greater number of days and navigation support infrastructures are not adequately installed in comparison to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
The importance of the Straits is widely recognized by those littoral countries (Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) which directly maintain the function of the Straits, international organizations (e.g. International Maritime Organization (IMO)) and user countries (e.g. Japan). Efforts have been made by the littoral countries and other stakeholders to avoid incidents such as ship collision, piracy attacks and oil spills. These efforts include, for example, the traffic separation scheme (TSS) for avoiding collisions between westbound and eastbound ships, navigational aid infrastructures (e.g. charts, beacons) for detecting shallow water channel points, and an information system (known as 2 Very Large Crude Oil Container: between 200,000 and 300,000 DWT (Dead Weight Tonnage) 3 Twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) is a unit of cargo capacity used to describe the capacity of container ships and container terminals based on the volume of a 20-foot-long (6.1 m) metal container. pg. 6 STRAITREP) for identifying ships' attributes such as ownership and country as a passport-type security check.
However, as is mentioned in the previous section, global critical infrastructures present major risk governance challenges due to trans-boundary risks inherent in complex systems both in infrastructures and socio-economic activities. The risk assessment itself remains an important issue for global critical infrastructures. Nevertheless, the need to develop a prototype methodology remains. The results obtained may provide a relatively concrete image for all stakeholders to share concerns and become better prepared for any accidents and disasters. Hong and Ng (2010) focus on the growing concerns of piracy and terrorism and point out the deficits of current international legal instruments. Bryant (2001) reviews historical tsunami disasters around the world, and describes the severe damage caused by the tsunami disaster in Indonesia. More investigation is needed on the tsunami risk around the Straits as well as other natural disaster risks, but because the Straits are surrounded and protected by islands, it is less likely that the impact of tsunami would be too severe on the Straits. In IRGC (2011), these possible hazards around the Straits are reviewed and summarized and three characteristic hazard scenarios are adopted: ship collisions, cyber attacks, and chemical facility explosion and fire.
Previous Studies on Hazard and Economic Impact Assessment
Hazard Assessment
Ship collisions are considered the most frequently occurring scenario under the considerably congested conditions of the Straits. A typical ship collision model has also been reviewed by Li et al. (2012) , but the likelihood of such a collision blocking the Straits for an extended period is estimated to be low. Cyber attack is one of the emerging risks which can target infrastructure systems. The scenario in the IRGC (2011) study is developed under the assumptions that port and ship operation systems are hampered. There is a possibility of collision due to malicious remote control, but the duration of the disruption to the Straits is not estimated to be as long as that seen in the chemical facility explosion and fire scenario. A chemical facility explosion and fire near the navigation channel would affect both the Straits and the ports resulting in a prolonged blockage of the Straits. Therefore, in this study the chemical facility explosion and fire scenario has been chosen. The details of this scenario are discussed in Section 3.
Economic Valuation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
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There are a few studies regarding the economic value assessment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. One pioneering work, carried out by Morisugi et al. (1992) , estimates the value of the Straits in terms of transportation costs. In this analysis, transportation costs are defined by ship rental fee and fuel costs and are compared between the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and the Lombok Strait, one of the main substitutable routes. In case that all the ships were to pass through the Lombok Strait instead of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the consequent increase in transportation costs is estimated at $84.0bn from 1966 to 1985, with the largest cost increase ($24.0bn) resulting from the import and export of petroleum between the Indian Ocean and Eastern Asia. Considering a future projection of increasing vessel traffic, then, the increased transportation costs incurred through use of the Lombok Strait would have been approximately three times higher ($257.3bn) between 1990 and 2009. In addition, it is estimated that the export and import structure would have changed due to these cost increases, and that petroleum imports to the United States would have been reduced by 16% based on a model of the elasticity of substitution. Shibasaki and Watanabe (2010) The IRGC (2011) focuses on the impacts on the domestic economies of affected littoral states.
The study assumes the loss of international shipping services from the littoral states due to damages both pg. 9 to port facilities and closure of the Straits. Based on a straightforward input-output analysis, the study estimated an economic loss of $18bn in the littoral states alone, assuming that the closure lasts for a year.
These studies illustrate a general picture of the importance of the Straits for both littoral states and user countries. The valuation methods adopted can vary and should be compared. What is important to note is that results are influenced by the type(s) of scenario(s) selected for analysis. The affected regions have to be identified and any infrastructures and artificial facilities, which could be damaged and could therefore expand damages, have to be carefully considered in each scenario. The recovery duration for damaged infrastructures can also affect economic impact scenarios. Fig. 2 illustrates the risk assessment considered in and the primary focuses of this study. Hazard assessment is carefully examined from the perspective of the impacts on the availability of the Straits, port facilities, and the duration of functional damage. The focus of the paper is on long-term disruption as a worst case scenario, which includes relatively minor incidents, thus a certain level of preparedness and foresight among all the stakeholders is expected to have been in place for both minor and major incidents. A scenario of chemical facility explosion would have the potential to influence both the navigation route and port facilities for an extended period. More details of hazard scenario settings are discussed in Section 3. Singapore, "Substitution of sea route" indicates that other straits, such as the Lombok Strait, are used as an alternative sea route. "Substitution of port" (international shipping service) denotes the case in which the Port of Singapore cannot be used and other ports as well as shipping service companies may overtake the position (functions) of the port. These two results are likely to bring about an increase in transportation costs. The other problem is that the productivity of domestic industries may decrease.
Risk Assessment in this Study
Firms have to consider substitutable methods for sea transportation, or shift to those industries which have less dependency on the affected port for production. Both a decrease in productivity and shipping service sales would affect local economies as well as the global economies which depend on goods from the affected country. The most likely scenario is that if these incident-chain disruptions were to last for a long period, the global economy would try to adjust to the situation by changing its trading pattern.
In order to analyze these sorts of economic impacts, one of the best approaches is to adopt a global economic model, such as an input-output modeling or a spatial computable general equilibrium modeling approach (SCGE). In recent years, the application of SCGE to the risk assessment of infrastructure disruption has been applied (Rose and Liao 2005; Tatano and Tsuchiya 2008) . In addition, thanks to efforts made to bring together international production and trading data, such as through the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) (Hertel 1997) , a global SCGE model is available for policy analysis. For example, Bosello et al. (2012) conducted an assessment on global economic impacts caused by sea level rise and derive from that assessment an analysis of the effectiveness of countermeasures. However, applications are still limited in the natural and technological risk assessment area and model setting procedures and the characteristics thereof are not well discussed. Our study later also provides potential applicability or benefits of global SCGE model to the MGCI problem by pg. 11 conducting several sensitivity analyses. It is shown that several preparedness and policy related parameters, such as swift change of supply chains and shipping company's pricing strategies, can affect the global impacts. For developing the global economic model for MGCI, efforts are also paid to estimating the transportation costs associated with detouring during the accident. 
HAZARD SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT: CHEMICAL FACILITY EXPLOSIONS
Chemical and petrochemical facilities that handle large volumes of hazardous materials pose a threat to navigation if a large accident were to occur in the form of an explosion, oil spill or toxic gas Disruptions in these zones could trigger cascading impacts throughout the global trade network and affect not only local coastal economies but also economies and societies elsewhere in the world.
Satellite pictures and other sources were consulted to determine storage tank distribution and storage tank diameters. Maximum storage quantities were estimated using typical height to diameter ratios for large atmospheric horizontal storage tanks, and assuming tanks were filled to 75% capacity (Austin 1988; Sinnott 1989 chemicals at these facilities were modeled and the areas that could be impacted by such releases were mapped. Table 1 shows the modeling results of the potential consequences of an explosion and a toxic gas release for a sample of industrial facilities (names have been omitted to protect identities). The table
shows the estimated maximum distance to a 1 psi overpressure (d-explo) and the maximum distance to a toxic endpoint (d-toxic) assuming a 10 min (or instantaneous for explosions) release of the total contents of the tank and the unavailability of mitigation measures. The distance from the largest storage tank to the deep water channel (d-deep) for each facility is listed in the last column. Furthermore, Table I provides information on the location and the number of large storage tanks and the volume of the largest vertical and spherical storage tank at each facility. Although it would require site-specific information to know where a particular chemical is stored, it is safe to assume that the identified chemicals are present at the relevant facilities, and could, therefore, be accidentally released. The center of each facility was chosen as the location of the point pg. 15 source. Mapping of the impact radius of the possible chemical accidents along the Straits and their six choke-points allowed the identification of chemical accident hotspots. Fig. 4 shows the maximum distance to a toxic end point for toxic gases, and the estimated maximum distance to a 1 psi overpressure, respectively, near the two accident hotspots identified: choke-points 4 and 5 along the navigation channel in the Strait of Singapore. Prevailing winds will determine the direction of toxic plume hazard.
The likelihood of any of the above scenarios occurring as a result of human error or process upset was considered relatively low due to the safety and mitigation measures put in place by industrial facility owners/operators to prevent major accidents. Nonetheless, the history of the petroleum,
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petrochemical and chemicals industries shows that such accidents do occur and often with catastrophic consequences (Mahoney 1997; Garrison 2002; Fewtrell and Hirst 1998; Kourniotis et al. 2000; Steinberg and Cruz 2004; Chang and Lin 2006; USCSB 2007a USCSB , b, 2010 . and models in this area. Roughly speaking, there are two major functions in the model. One is the utility maximization of regional households and the other is the cost minimization of industries. Equilibrium is achieved as a result of these two optimization behaviors. Regional household utility maximization determines the consumption and savings of households and government as well as the investments of global banks based on their utility functions.
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The behavior of the industrial sector significantly affects the results of the following case study.
Essentially, the structure of production, given in Fig. 5 , determines the behavior of the industrial sector.
In the production function, four different types of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function are used, and a representative CES functional form in case of two factor inputs can be expressed as:
where Y : Production output, X1, X2: Input, : Substitution parameter, α : Efficiency parameter, β :
Distribution parameter. Basically, as the value of increases, either X1 or X2 can be substituted more 
pg. 20
In the explosion scenario, the major focus is to establish how damages to the production system and cost increases in the sea transportation sector can be expressed in the model. As shown in the emboldened text in the production structure given in Fig. 5 , this study stresses the characteristics of four key parameters. Simultaneous shocks are considered and several vital parameters are changed and tested as a sensitivity analysis.
Firstly, in the sea transportation sector, the efficient parameter α of the Leontieff function can be decreased if there is damage to port facilities. This will create a supply shock in sea transportation services, affecting not only the damaged country but also the rest of the world. CES parameters for intermediates, d σ and e σ , are also of research interest5. In the case of technological disaster, industries are not able to change suppliers as swiftly as they might under normal circumstances. This is because adjustment costs become expensive, particularly since companies will need to analyze the situation and look for alternative contracts while competing with many other companies facing a similar situation. The values of the parameters used in GTAP are obtained as a result of long-term adjustment. To reflect the particular conditions considered in this study, a sensitivity analysis on d σ and e σ was conducted by adopting half values of the default settings.
The assumption of capital movement among sectors and countries also affects the results. In particular, in a default model in GTAP, there is an assumed restriction of capital movement among countries but not among sectors in a single country. However, as discussed in the previous paragraph, this assumption does not hold true and the cases in which capital movement is allowed are simulated in the following sector. In GTAP, this adjustment can be conducted by changing the substitution parameters, 5 The values range 3.8-11.8 for e σ and 1.9-5.1 for d σ .
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since capital movement is also described in CES functional form.
On the other hand, a transportation cost shock (the reflection of detour costs onto international shipping prices) is described through a technical change of the sea transportation system. Here, transportation technology indicates an aggregation of cost reduction developments such as the reduction of vessel fuel consumption rate. In GTAP, the relationship between transportation cost and transportation technology is described as follows. Average cost of all the transportation cost, ( , , ) AT i r s : Technical status of transportation system. Therefore, all costs peculiar to the routes and goods are expressed by the term of technical status ( , , ) AT i r s . Furthermore, the technical status ( , , ) AT i r s is composed of three different terms as follows: 
Estimation of Transportation Costs
An increase in transportation costs can be a major trigger of global economic impacts and for this reason the background data used to calculate these costs should be collected carefully. In particular,
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in a case study of the Straits, it is crucial to estimate the number of vessels passing through the Straits and the additional cost incurred by each type of vessel as a result of detour. The calculation of international shipping cost divided by the volume of trading goods also represents information indispensable to the investigation of the impact of cost increases on each trading good.
A detailed survey of vessels in the Straits was conducted by JAMS (2006) There is a clearly increasing trend over the 10 year period. The largest increase is in the number of container ships. Yearly data has been estimated by vessel size by applying the proportion of vessel types observed in Fig. 6. pg. 23 
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In order to establish the increased costs resulting from the detour of all ships, several assumptions must be made to compensate for that data not directly available. In a previous study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Morisugi et al.(1992) focused on ship charter fees and bunker costs as primary sources of cost increase. For example, the study estimated that for an oil tanker of 230,000
DWT the charter fee is $22,000/day, and the bunker cost is $27,000/day. The daily charge for an extension of the ship, therefore, is $49,000. However, these costs are in constantly fluctuation and may sometimes change rapidly due to global economic investment booms and depressions, particularly in recent years, and it is therefore necessary to elaborate the ranges of these costs to some extent.
Another problem is that daily charter fees are not available for container ships and some other ships. One approach is to estimate a charter fee from the available capital costs (construction costs) of different ship types. It is reasonable to assume the expected return is similar if the capital costs are similar. The relationship between construction costs and daily ship charter fees for bulk carriers have been investigated from this perspective. Fig. 8 illustrates the relationship between ship charter fees and construction costs for the last ten years for bulk carriers using published data sources (MOL 2012; Clarkson 2008 Clarkson -2011 . A relatively acceptable linear relationship between two indicators is shown and this relationship has been adopted for the estimation of the ship charter fees for those vessels for which construction costs are available. There is also a limitation in using the construction cost approach to obtain the accurate charter cost, because these costs are not available for or do not exactly match all the different vessel sizes and types shown in Table 4 . The representative or alternative construction costs data for such vessels have been estimated by allocating similar and available bulk carrier vessel sizes as shown in Table V. pg. 25 
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The last cost item to be estimated is the bunker cost, which is the result of the combined effect of fuel price and fuel consumption. Akakura and Sema (2010) analyzed the fuel consumption rate of bulk carrier ships and obtained a good statistical correlation between the ship size of bulk carrier and the fuel consumption rate, as follows:
where Y: Fuel Consumption (MT/Day), X: Vessel Size (DWT(10 3 ) ). Assuming that the fuel consumption rate depends on vessel size and further that the speed of the vessel is fixed, this statistical relationship can be applied to all types of vessel. For bunker cost, this study adopted yearly average bunker cost statistics as summarized by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2011) and set the price statistics of CT380 (Singapore) as representative bunker costs. Fig. 9 gives the estimated average costs for a one day trip per one ship for three different benchmark years. 2004 is the baseline case, which is consistent with global trade statistics, and 2002 and 2007 are the years where the ship charter costs and bunker costs are the lowest and highest respectively between 2001 and 2009. In the case that all the ships were required to use the Lombok Strait, it is estimated that each journey would take an addition72.7 hours (METI 2005) . The following case studies assume that the shipping costs increase as a result of the additional 72.7 hours of voyage time.
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Results and Discussions
Baseline Case
Since data sets on vessels and global trade from 2004 are available, we set up the case study using 2004 data, using an economic model with default GTAP model parameters, and adopted as the baseline case the scenario that both the Straits and their Ports were shut down. Fig. 10 shows the results of economic losses for the baselinecase in terms of equivalent valuation (EV), a measure of welfare in the region. The Lombok Strait plays the role of the alternative route, which would cause an additional 72.7 hours for shipping per voyage. There is the possibility that small vessels would be able to pass though the Sunda Strait, which provides a shorter route compared to the Lombok Strait route, but for the purposes of this study it is assumed that all vessels pass through the Lombok Strait, in consideration of the increasing trend of large-size vessels. In total, the average additional sea transportation cost becomes 5.76 %. It may be noted that Morisugi et al. (1992 Morisugi et al. ( ) estimated figures of $84.3bn between 1966 Morisugi et al. ( and 1985 , and anticipated $257.3bn for the next 20 years ($12.9bn/year) in consideration of increasing trends of bulk and petroleum vessels. The method adopted by Morisugi et al. (1992) is different to that applied here and it is therefore difficult to compare results, but the economic impacts given in this study is estimated are more severe, partly because the CGE model used in this study adopts the impacts on the world economy through price changes.
Direct reasons for welfare changes are increases in commodity prices and decreases in regional income. For example, in the case that both the Straits and the Port of Singapore are closed, a simple average of world price indices among different commodities, excluding sea transportation, increases by 0.03%, and the world price index for the sea transportation sector increases by 6.99%. At each country level, the increase in price index varies between 0.10% and 0.27%, while on the other hand, regional income decreases in many of the counties. Some of the countries and regions, such as the EU, Japan and North America record slight gains, but not as much as the price increase.
pg. 29 Note that it is a limitation of this analysis that more detailed information is not available in the sea transportation sector. Normally, the sea transportation sector consists of port facilities, vessels, and vessel construction industries. In addition, the locations of port facilities are not taken into account.
Most of the alternative services to the Port of Singapore would be executed by substitute ports within Asia. In this case, a hare of international shipping service provided by the EU could be reduced. Such effects go beyond the limitations of this analysis; a more detailed segregation of the sea transportation sector and the consideration of geographical locations of ports are required to advance this research.
Sensitivity Analysis
(1) Transportation costs pg. 31 almost linear relationship can be seen between transportation costs and economic losses. That is, in many countries, as the transportation cost doubles, the economic losses also doubles. pg. 32
(2) Effects of Capital Movement
In the baseline case, it is assumed as a default that capital can be moved, but it is more likely that capital movement cannot be smoothly executed in a short period. Fig. 13 compares the case with and the case without capital movement for a sensitivity analysis. In the case that capital movement is restricted, the first point would be the enlargement of welfare losses in Singapore. This is mainly caused by the loss of substitution by other transportation services. The second point would be the result that losses are reduced in those other countries which substitute international shipping services. The major reason for this would be the increase in international shipping costs as a result of the loss of substitution options caused by the restriction of capital movement among sectors. In this way, capital movements work to spread losses throughout the world and to reduce the damages incurred by the most significantly affected country (Singapore). In total, loss is decreased from $-17,947m to $-19,407m by not allowing capital movement. these changes tend to increase the damages to Singapore and reduce the losses of the EU, Japan and
China, as is seen in the capital movement case. However, in contrast to the capital movement case, the total losses increase from $19,408m to $20,855m in the "Regional allocation: half values" case and to $29,911m in the "Import/domestic allocation: half values" case. The case in which transportation services in Singapore cannot be substituted by services from other regions results in significantly more impact on other industries, especially those located in Singapore. 
Change of EV ($m)
Import/domestic allocation: half values
Regional allocation: half values
Base Case
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The final investigation concerns pricing policy/strategy in the sea transportation sector. The baseline case assumes that world international shipping costs increase at the same rate to cover all detour costs.
Another possible strategy for shipping companies is to charge extra shipping costs only to those trading goods which pass through the Straits. In other words, detour costs are not directly reflected in the transportation costs of bilateral trades which do not pass thorough the Straits, such as trades between
Latin America and North America. In the case that all detour costs are reflected in the shipping costs for the goods passing through the Straits, the shipping costs for those goods is estimated to increase by 48.17%. Fig. 15 shows that this increase significantly affects most of Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and the EU. Some regions experience increased profit, but total global losses increase from $-19,407m to $-24,520m. pg. 35
CONCLUSIONS
This study proposes a prototype risk assessment case study for "maritime global critical infrastructures", focusing on the economic impacts of disruption. Due to the globally shared and intensively used nature of such infrastructure, the disruption of any MGCI would result in significant trans-boundary impacts across the globe. Risk reduction efforts, such as the development of alternative infrastructures, are required for MGCIs. However, as with the deficits of MCGI risk governance, described in the previous study, the assessment of externalities, such as environmental, societal and economic impacts, remain necessary tasks and has not yet been fully conducted. As a result, the share-burden among stakeholders for preventing such a disruption continues to be ambiguous.
To provide, therefore, a reference case model for assessing economic impacts, one of the significant externalities related to MGCIs, this study conducted an in-depth analysis of the case of a chemical facility explosion scenario at the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. For this case study, a database of chemical facilities was constructed and transportation costs were estimated from various types of vessel and bunker costs, after which the chemical explosion model and global economic impact assessment model were integrated to determine those regions physically and economically affected, as well as to consider their economic losses. In the analysis, the disruption of port services and detour costs were considered as the primary shocks to impact the world economy, after which trade patterns and total economic losses were estimated based on a global CGE model.
The results show that economic impacts are severe in Singapore as a result of damages to the sea transportation sector and that the impacts spread to the rest of world through increases in transportation costs. It has also been demonstrated that some elements of the shocks may be absorbed pg. 36
through the adaptive behavior of other economic sectors, such as substitutions of goods and services, labor and capital movement to sectors where there is greater scarcity. In order to interpret the effect of key parameter values, the range of economic impacts were also captured by conducting several sensitivity analyses on transportation costs, capital movement, substitution parameters, and the cost increase strategies of shipping companies. In this case study, the total economic costs are estimated as ranging from around $13,000m to $28,000m depending on certain key parameters. In particular, the results can drastically change as a result of abrupt increases in oil costs and in the pricing strategies adopted by shipping companies, such as which route price they will increase. As such, mitigation measures should be discussed in consideration of the fluctuations of key economic indicators and in the context of all stakeholders including shipping companies.
In this way, this paper provides a prototype risk assessment model and case study of MGCI, and the results derived thereof can be used to share the critical importance of target infrastructures on a global scale, and to establish cost-effective countermeasure investments. The distribution of losses in each country may be reflected in a share-burden scheme for such countermeasure investments. However, more work is necessary to improve this approach. In particular, geographical location and the advantage(s) of alternative infrastructures are not considered in models and in data and the values of parameters, such as substitution parameters, require more thorough investigation. For example,
Singapore provides high quality kerosene for air transportation through its Strait and Port, which is likely less easily substituted than other goods and has potentially significant secondary impacts in the event of distribution disruption. Stakeholder workshops based on the model and case study adopted in this paper would also help to develop additional scenarios and to foster the development of the risk pg. 37 governance scheme.
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